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late one of the judges of the Queen's Bench, in a letter to the
author, declared so remarkable.
The "homo unius libri" is proverbially a dangerous antagonist,
and so in another sense he may prove a most valuable friend and
ally. One test to which the writer has put Mr. Robinson's work
has been on the suggestion of any difficulty to apply to his pages for
the solution, and almost i nvariably the work has answered his
appeal, either by solving the difficulty or showing him that the
question is yet an open one among the learned, and introducing him
to all that is important which has been said on the subject.
To the advanced student, and to the man actively engaged in
the administration of the law, this work of Mr. Robinson's seems
alike invaluable; a copy of it in many country towns, where wellselected libraries are rare, would be invaluable. It is to be hoped
the learned author may live to complete that which has evidently
been with him a labor of love. However that may be, in what
has been accomplished, the author has already paid handsomely
the debt which every lawyer is said to owe to his profession. To
that profession we cordially recommend the book.
P. P. M.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
JOHN W. KIMBROUGII, APPELLANT,

V.
APPELLEES.

GEORGE LANE ET

AL.,

A contract having for its consideration an agreement to suppress a criminal
prosecution is void.
It is equally so, if any part of the consideration was the suppression of the prosecution, and whether the contract was induced by promises or threats on one side
or the other.
It is not necessary that the promise should be made at the same time as the contract; it is sufficient if it was made prior thereto, and was acted upon as a part
of the consideration or inducement.
Nor does it make any difference that a prosecution is already commenced and
z-in the hands and under the control of the Commonwealth's officer, if the private
prosecutor, as consideration for the contract, promises to abandon his own efforts
in the course of justice. The particular interest of the party injured, in bringing
the offender to justice, is one of the securities of the public in the enforcement
of the laws, and any agreement by which this interest is turned against the Commonwealth is void.

Tnis was a suit in equity, brought by appellant in the Bath Circuit Court, against the appellees, George Lane and T. 0. Owings,
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on a note for $3000, executed by them to him September 18th
1872, which recites that it was given in consideration of a note
due by Lane & Brothers to the appellant for $8600, from which
they had been discharged in bankruptcy.
He also sought to foreclose a mortgage upon sixty-seven and a

half acres of land, given by Owings to secure the payment of the
note, and J. A. J. Lee having purchased the land, was made a
defendant.
The defendants answered in substance that George Lane, for himself and brothers, purchased and received of the plaintiff a number
of mules, for which a note was executed to and accepted by him;
that afterward the plaintiff came to the said George and expressed
some uneasiness as to the sufficiency of the note, and prevailed on
the said George to execute to him a mortgage on a tract of land
to secure the debt; that about March 1872, the plaintiff was foreman of the grand jury of Harrison county, and induced said grand
jury to find and present an indictment against said George for
obtaining the mules by false pretences ; that he was arrested, and
-while in attendance at the Harrison Circuit Court for trial on said
charge, "the plaintiff proposed and agreed to and with said
George that if he would pay or secure to him $3000 he would
have the criminal prosecution aforesaid dismissed, and that he
would not appear as a witness against him. He and his wife were
the prosecuting witnesses, and the defendants say in consideration
that the plaintiff would procure the dismissal of said prosecution,
the bond sued on was executed, and the plaintiff did thereupon, in
consideration thereof, abandon the prosecution and procured its
dismissal. The mortgage was executed by defendant Owings at
the same time and for no other consideration."
The cause subsequently came into the Bath County Court of
Common Pleas, where a trial was had, which resulted in a judgment dismissing the petition, and this appeal is prosecuted to
reverse that judgment.
A. Duval, .Nesbitt & Gufgell and Win. HT. Hlolt, for appellant.
Ayperson J-Beid and Reid J- Stone, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COFER, J.-It is an old and well-settled rule of the common law
that contracts having for their consideration an agreement to stifle
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a criminal prosecution are void, because they are against the policy
of" the law, which will not permit an injury to the pu.blic to be
made the subject of.private agreements whereby the redress of the
public wrong may be hindered or defeated. And it is equally
well settled that if any part, however small, of the entire consideration of a contract be vicious, the whole contract is void.
Every citizen is under an obligation to the public to abstain
from voluntarily placing himself in a position in which it is to his
pecuniary interest to suppress, stifle or impede a public prosecution. "The Commonwealth has a right to rely upon the individual who has received special injury from the commission of a
public offence, as the special instrument for its ascertainment and
punishment in the due course of law."
"The particular interest which he may be supposed to feel in
bringing the offender to justice is one of the securities on which
the public relies, and has a right to rely, for the enforcement of
the laws and its own safety, and an agreement by which this interest is turned against the Commonwealth is in violation of her
rights and policy:" Gardner v. Maxey, 9 B. Mon. 90; Swan,
ft., v. C-handler &fPhillips, 8 Id 98.
That such is the law was conceded in the argument, but it was
insisted that the evidence did not show that such an agreement as
that set forth in the answer was made. Gedrge Lane and Owings
both testified directly and positively that an agreement in substance the same as that set forth in the answer was made. This,
however, is contradicted by the appellant and two other persons
present at the time the agreement to execute the note and mortgage was finally entered into, who say that the appellant then
distinctly said that he could not make any arrangement with Lan&
by which he would agree to have the indictment dismissed, or fail
to appear as a witness against him ; that the case was in the hands
of the Commonwealth, and would have to be disposed of by the
court; that he could in no way control the prosecution, and would
not undertake to do so.
The appellant swore that he did not speak to the Commonwealth's attorney on the subject of dismissing the indictment, and
the attorney swore that he dismissed itbecause, after talking with
the witnesses, he was satisfied he could not make out a case. If
this was all the evidence in the record upon the subject, we should
incline to the opinion that the agreement set forth in 'the answer
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was not established by the evidence; but there are other important
facts which, although they do not prove that there was an express
agreement made at the time the note and mortgage were given,
prove that appellant and Lane and Owings then understood that the
prosecution would be abandoned if the sum of $3000 was secured
to the appellant, and that the execution of these securities was the
condition on which he would not only refrain from a vigorous
prosecution through counsel employed by him for that purpose,
but would abandon all efforts to bring Lane to trial.
The prosecution was called September 16th 1872, and set for trial
on the 18th of that month, and attachments were awarded against
absent witnesses for the Commolbwealth. On the 18th, after the
case was called for trial, the appellant and his counsel employed to
aid in the prosecution, retired with Lane and Owings, and one of
the Commonwealth's witnesses, to a consulting-room in the courthouse, and there, while the question of proceeding with the trial was
before the court, and when, for aught that appears, the Commonwealth was ready to proceed with the trial, the appellant entered
into, or rather renewed, negotiations with Lane for securing a part
of his debt, from which, according to the recital in the note then
given, Lane had been discharged in bankruptcy. Owings proved,
without contradiction by any one, that during this interview the
appellant desired him (Owings) to mortgage his land to secure the
sum of $3000; that he was unwilling to do so, but offered to give
him personal security, which he refused to accept; that the appellant then rose from his seat and said that "that was the last
damned proposition he intended to make; that he had Bath county
money to prosecute George Lane with ;" and thereupon Owings
agreed to execute the mortgage, and did so.
Appellant agreed, if this was done, to discharge the attorney
he had employed to aid in the prosecution, and immediately did so;
and he also promised that if Lane was brought to trial on the
indictment he would surrender the note and mortgage.
Some of the Commonwealth's witnesses, against whom attachments were awarded on the 16th, and who were present on the
18th, returned home that day, and no further action seems to have
been taken in the case until September 24th 1874, when, on motion
of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the indictment was dismissed.
Owings's deposition was taken in December 1873, and he proved
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that prior to the execution of the note and mortgage, the appellant
said to Lane that, for $2500 in cash, or $3000 on time, he would
dismiss the prosecution.
This proposition, he says, was not made in his presence, but
Lane and appellant were in a room together and sent for him, and
appellant then told him what proposition he had made. The
appellant gave his deposition in March 1874, but failed to contradict Owings's statement. After the date of the note and mortgage, and before the indictment was dismissed, appellant wrote to
Lane as follows:
"1I think I am fully satisfied that you are co-operating with
parties to put me to some trouble to secure the money on the note
I hold against you. All I have to say to you is this: I was taken
out by several persons the day I was in Owingsville, and an effort
made to get from me something to commit you in your county.
I evaded all questions. You know what I promised you, but that
promise depends upon your action in this matter. If anything is
gotten hold of against you in Bath county you will find things
hotter than you have any idea of at this time. Everything depends
upon, not what you can do to refute, but to advance this matter to
a final settlement."
These facts leave no room to doubt that, at the time the note and
mortgage were given, it was understood by all parties present that
the prosecution would end, so far as appellant was concerned, as
soon as the required security was given, and it is equally clear
that it was likewise understood that, unless they were given, the
case would go on as far as it was in his power to carry it on.
Why declare that he had made his last proposition, and that he
had money to carry on the prosecution, if he did not mean to be
understood as intending to carry it on, if his demand was not
acceded to, and to abandon it if his debt was secured?
If he had made no promise, express or implied, to abandon the
prosecution, to what promise did he refer in his letter ? If the
further prosecution was not to be abandoned, why not proceed with
it in September 1872, when, as far as appears, the Commonwealth
was ready to go on with it?
Considerable stress is laid by his counsel upon the declaration
proved to have been made by the appellant at the interview, which
resulted in the execution of the note and mortgage, that he could
not make any arrangement by which he would undeftake to have
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the indictment aismissed, and that he would not fail or refuse to
testify if called for that purpose; that the case was in the handh
of the Commonwealth, and would have to be disposed of by the
court.
If this evidence stood alone in the record it might be entitled
to some consideration, but when viewed in connection with his
former offer to dismiss the indictment for 1$2500 in cash, or $3000
on-time, and his declaration at the time when the negotiation was
closed that be had made his last proposition, and had money to
prosecute Lane with, his agreement to surrender the note and
mortgage if the prosecution went on; the fact that from that
moment it seems to have been wholly abandoned, and the reference
in his letter to Lane to the promise be had made, and his covert
threat, if Lane did not keep the promise made by him, we do not
regard the declaration that he did not intend to bind himself to
interfere between Lane and the Commonwealth as furnishing any
evidence whatever *that he did not make the promise imputed to
him in the answer.
It is not necessary that the promise should have been made at
the very moment, or even on the same day, of the execution of the
writings; it is enough if it appears that such a promise was made
at that time or prior thereto, and that all parties acted in view of
that promise, or that it was the inducement which operated upon
the minds of the obligors.
The appellant was the person alleged to have been injured by
the act for which Lane was indicted, and the public had a right to
rely upon the interest which he would naturally feel in having him
brought to punishment in due course of law, and has a right to com,
plain of a contract, the direct natural effect of which was to turn
that interest against the Commonwealth. Such contracts are
highly reprehensible when made by one having no other relation
to a prosecution than that of being the person injured by the public
offence, but when, in addition to being the party specially aggrieved,
he is also connected with the origin of the prosecution by having
been a member of the grand jury by which the indictment was
found, the courts should scan the transaction with jealous vigilance
in order to avoid being made the instruments of oppression in the
hands of those who, for vengeance or profit, may seek through
public prosecution to. extort money to which they are not legally
entitled, or for the recovery of which civil process affords them no

KIMBROUGII v. LANE.

remedy, and for the farther purpose of guarding the instrumentalities provided by law for the detection and punishment of crime
from corruption.
No citizen can be put upon trial for an infamous crime, except
upon the indictment of a grand jury. This has been thought so
valuable a safeguard to individuals as to deserve a place in the Bill
of Rights in our Constitution. But it will prove a snare instead of
a protection ifa member of a grand jury, conceiving himself to have
been the victim of a felony, may, by his own testimony, and, if
need be, his own vote and personal influence with his fellow grand
jurors, procure an indictment against the supposed criminal, and
then by threats of a vigorous prosecution if his private grievance
is not redressed, and promises express or implied that he will forbear if they are complied with, obtain an enforcible contract for
his own indemnity.
Where a person injured by a criminal act was himself a member
of the grand jury by which the alleged offender was indicted, and
the aggrieved person enters into negotiations with the accused for
his own indemnity for losses resulting from the criminal act, and
the prosecution is suddenly abandoned, especially after threats that
it -will be carried on vigorously unless indemnity be made, it will
require but slight evidence to satisfy the court, not only that there
was an agreement to compound the offence, but that the prosecution
was set on foot to bring the accused and his friends to terms.
It is urged by some of appellant's counsel that as Lee purchased
the land mortgaged by Owings, subject to the mortgage, and he will
be so much the gainer if the appellant fails in his efforts to foreclose, while Owings and Lane will gain nothing, this ought to have
some weight with the court in deciding the question.
It is sufficient to say on this point that the rule of law inhibiting
such contracts was not made for the benefit of the obligors in the
illegal contract. They stand in no better position in the eyes of
the law than the obligees.
The courts will not enforce such contracts, because they are
levelled at the safety and repose of society, and are calculated to
shield the guilty from punishment and leave them free to prey
upon the public. If money is paid upon such a contract, the
courts will not aid in recovering it back; they will leave both
parties in the exact position in which they have placed themselves.
Though we differ somewhat from the learned judge below in our
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conclusion from the facts, his judgment is right and must be
affirmed.
v. Wfoordfall, supra ; Wdlock v. Constintine, supra. But this doctrine has been
repudiated : White v. ,Spettigue, supra;
in regard to which we fear the law of
this country is by no means up to the Wells v. Abrahams, supra. But the
standard of the English common law, latter case distinctly recognises the rule
either in principle or administration. of law thlat the civil remedy is susThe'rule in the English courts is very pended during the prosecution for felony
extensively discussed in Wells v. Abra- and cannot be pressed until that has been
hams, Law Rep. 7 Q. B. 554, in regard terminated either by conviction or ao.
to the right of any civil remedy, and quittal without plaintiff's connivance:
what remedy, the party aggrieved by a Crosby v. Long, supra.
felonious act, which also involves an
But we are not aware that this rule
infraction of private right, may demand has ever been enforced to any great exin a court of justice.
tent, if at all, in this country : MetIt seems to have been intimated in calf's note 2 to itggins v. Butcher,
some of the early English cases, that Yelv. 89. But the rule of the common
the civil remedy, or right of action, is law, thatall contracts for compounding
merged in the felony: Hliggins v. or stifling prosecutions for felony are
.13utcher, Yelv. 89 ; Duwkes v. Coveneigh, illegal and:void, is maintained here to
Styles 346; BULLER, J., in Masters v. the fullest extent. The compounding
111Miler, 4 Term Rep. 320-332 ; Crosby v. of felony or stifling prosecutions thereLong, 12 East 4J9. In the latter case for, is also indictable as a misdemeanor
it was held only to be suspended till the in most of the American states, either
defendant was convicted or acquitted of
by special statute or by force of common
the criminal charge without connivance. law. It has often been intimated in
But later cases treat the civil right English eases that this rule did not exof action as merely suspended until tend to mere misdemeanors, and that
the offender shall be convicted : lVeliock parties interested in such prosecutions
v. Constantine, 2 Hurlst. & Colt. 146
might lawfully compound them : ElGhnmqon v. Voor fall, 2 C. & P. 41
worthy v. Bird, 9 Moore 230 ; 2 Bing.
White v. ,Zpettigue, 13 M. & W. 603. 258 ; Drage v. lbbetsons, 2 Esp. 643;
And the rule does not apply to one who ELLENtOROUGH, Ch. J., in Taylor v.
waived the right innocently.
Lendey, 9 East 49. But this rule is
In the case of 1lVells v. Abrahams, confined, we believe, to prosecutions for
supra, it is agreed by all the judges, offences where the party aggrieved is
that, although the felon cannot plead his principally concerned, and where the
own crime either in bar or suspension compromise is effected under the advice
of the civil remedy, as held in Luttrell of the court, by virtue of the English
v. Reynell, I Mod. 282, yet that if the statute 18 Eliz., e. 5, s. 3. For in
felony appear either upon the declara- Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wilson 341, 1
tion or evidence, it is competent in some Smith's L. C. 489, the question how
proper mode to stay proceedings in the far the contract for stifling or comcivil action, until the felon shall be pounding a prosecution for perjury,
convicted. Some of the cases go the which is only a misdemeanor in Englength of holding that in such case it land, and securities given in furtheris the duty of the court to interfere sua ance of such compromise, may be ensponte and stay the civil action : Gimson forced in the courts, was greatly disThe foregoing opinion discusses a

question of great practical importance,
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cussed, and it was clearly held, that no
action can be maintained upon any such
contract where any part of the consideration ariscs from such compromise,
thus making no distinction between
felony and other offences of similar
enormity.
We have examined the facts upon
which the court deny tile validity of the
contract in the principal case, and it
seems to us the decision is based upon
most satisfactory grounds ; for the contract seems to have had no other con-

CITY OF KEENE.
sideration but the compromise or abandonment of the prosecution against the
defendant, and was expressly agreed to
be surrendered if the defendant were
brought to trial. There would seeni,
then, to be no ground to argue that the
contract did not rest exclusively upon
the abandonment of the criminal prosecution, which, though not for a felony,
was an offence of the same public claracter and of great moral turpitude.
I. F. R.

Superior Court of New Hampshire.
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The laying of taxes is a legislative function, and the policy and expediency
of it, as well as its amount, are questions exclusively for that department of the
state.
There is no abstract legal principle by which to determine whether a use is
public; a court must decide it as a conclusion of fact and public policy, in the
same manner as the legislature. Hence, while it is clearly the duty of a court to
determine finally what is a public purpose, it will only decide adversely to the
judgment of the legislature in a clear case.
If a purpose is public, it makes no differene that the agent by whom it is to be
carried out is a private individual or corporation.
The building of a railroad is a public purpose; and a statute authorizing a town
to vote money to aid in such purpose, even though the money is to be given as a
gratuity and not as a subscription to stock, is not unconstitutional as a taking
of private property for a private use.

THIS was a bill in equity, by certain tax-payers in Keene, praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants from issuing bonds,
&c., in aid of the construction of the Manchester and Keene Railroad, in pursuance of a vote of the city councils to that end. The
facts are stated in the opinion.

Sargent & Chase and Hardg, for the plaintiffs.
Lane, Faulknerand Burns, for the defendants.
LADD, J.-" Any town may, by a two-thirds vote, raise, by tax
or loan, such sums of money as they shall deem expedient, not
exceeding five per cent. of the valuation thereof, * * * and appropriate the same to aid in the construction of any railroad in

this state, in such manner as they shall deem proper :" Gen. Stats.,
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ch. 84, §16.
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In accordance with the provisions of this statute,
the inhabitants of the city of Keene have voted a subsidy equal to
three per cent. of their last property valuation, to aid in the construction of that part of the Manchester and Keene Railroad located
between Greenfield and Keene. This sum, amounting to upwards
of $130,000, is called a "gratuity" in the vote. It is, in fact, an
appropriation of that amount, to be raised by a public tax, to the
purpose of building a railroad, with no equivalent, except the expected benefits to be derived from the opening of such railroad.
The plaintiffs, who are citizens and large tax-payers in Keene,
contend that the legislature, in passing the act quoted above, transcended the limits of their constitutional power; that the action
of the city in voting the gratuity is therefore without warrant
of law, and they ask for an injunction to prevent the issuing of
bonds or the levy of taxes in accordance with said vote.
The question we are thus called upon to consider is an important
one, not only in its legal aspects, but in its practical bearing upon
the rights and interests of these parties, as well as others in a
similar situation, both tax-payers and holders of municipal bonds
heretofore issued for a like purpose under the authority of the act
in question.
In one view, the duty of the court is extremely.plain and simple;
in another, it is delicate and not free from difficulty. We have
not to inquire into the policy of the law or (if the purpose be admitted to be public) whether the supposed public good to be
attained was sufficient to justify the legislature in conferring upon
two-thirds of the legal voters of a town the power to devote, not
only their own property, but that of the unwilling other third, to
such a purpose. All mere questions of expediency, and all questions respecting the just operation of the law, within the limits
prescribed by the constitution, were settled by the legislature when
it was enacted. The court have only to place the statute and the
constitution side by side, and say whether there is such a conflict
between the two that they cannot stand together. If, upon such
examination, there appears to be a conflict, and if the conflict is so
c&har and palpable as to leave no reasonable doubt that the legislature have undertaken to do what they were prohibited from doing
by the constitution, the court cannot avoid the high, though unwelcome, duty of declaring the statute inoperative, because the constitution and not the statute is the paramount law, and the court
must interpret and administer all the laws alike.
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The learned counsel for the plaintiffs have not pointed out the
particular part or clause of the constitution which they say is violated by this statute. Their position, however, is that the act
authorizes the taking of private property under the name and
guise of taxation, and appropriating it to a use that is really and
essentially private; and that such a proceeding, being manifestly
at war with those fundamental principles upon which the right of
the citizen to be secure in the possession and enjoyment of his property depends, is in violation of all those provisions in the constitution established to guard and perpetuate that right.
The proposition assumes this form: The legislature are forbidden
by the constitution to exact money from the people of the state
under the name of t6xes and apply it to a private purpose; this
statute authorizes the act thus forbidden, and is therefore void.
The first part of this proposition is admitted by the defendants,
and so we need not now inquire in what particular provision of the
constitution the inhibition is to be found. Whether it rests upon
the commonly received meaning and definition of the terms: taxes,
rates, assessments, &c., used in the constitution, and the general

guaranties of private property contained in the Bill of Rights, or
whether, by a fair construction of art. 5, the levying of all taxes,

municipal as well as state, is limited to the purposes therein named,
viz., for the public service, in the necessary defence and support
of the government of this state, and the protection and preservation of the subjects thereof, is at present immaterial, inasmuch as.
we are to start with the assumption that taxes cannot be imposed
or authorized by the legislature for any other than a public
purpose.
Is the building of a railroad a public purpose? The legislature
have undoubtedly passed their judgment on that 4uestion, and determined that it is. It is not to be denied that the levying of
taxes is specially and entirely a legislative function, and the court
are not to encroach upon the province of a co-ordinate branch of
the government in the exercise of that power. Where is the line
that divides the province of the court from that of the legislature
in a matter of this sort ? The court is to expound and administer
the laws, and there the judicial function and duty ends. How
much of the question, whether a given object is public, lies within
the province of the law, and how much in the domain of political
science and statesmanship? When.the judge has declared all the
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law that enters into the problem, how much is still left for the determination of the legislature? Admitting, as has, indeed, been
more than intimated in this state (Concord Railroad v. Greeley,
17 N. H. 57), that it is for the court finally to determine whether
the use is public, what is the criterion-what are the- rules which
the law furnishes to the court, wherewith to eliminate a true answer
to the inquiry ? In what respect does the question as presented
to. the court, differ from the same question as presented to the leg.islature ? If the court stop, when they reach the borders of legislative ground, how far can they proceed? If the legislature
should take the property of A., or the property of all the tax-payers
in the town of A., and hand it over without consideration, without
pretence of any public obligation or duty to B., to be used by him
in buying a farm, or building a house, or setting himself up in
business, the case would be so clear, that the common sense of every
one would at once say the limits of legislation have been overstepped, by a taking of private property i and devoting it to a private use. That is the broad ground upon which such cases as
Allen v. Jay, 12 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 481, s. c. 60 Me. 124;
Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; and The Oitizen's Loan Association v. Topeka, Sup. Ct. U. S., were decided. And yet what
rule of law do the courts find to aid them in thus revising the judgment of the legislature? Is it not clear that the question they pass
upon is the same question as that deciaed by the legislature, and
that they must determine it in the same way the legislature have
done, simply by the exercise of reason and judgment?
What is it that settles the character of a given purpose in respect of its being public or otherwise? It has been said that for the
legislature to declare a use public, does not make it so (17 N. H.
57), and the same may certainly be said, with equal truth of a like
declaration by the court. A judicial christening can no more affect
the nature of the thing itself than a legislative christening. Judging a priori, and without some knowledge of the wants of mankind when organized in communities and states, I do not quite
understand how it could be predicated of any use that it is per se
public: DixoN, C. J., in Whiting v. Sh'eboygan Railway Co., 9
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 161.
Of light, air, water, &c., the common bounties of providence,
it might, indeed, be said beforehand that they are in a very broad
sense public; but it is not of such uises that we are speaking.
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Without knowledge of human nature, knowledge derived from experience and observation of what may be needful for the comfort,
well being and prosperity of the people of a state advanced in
civilization, and knowledge gained in the same way as to what
necessary conditions of their welfare will be supplied by private
enterprise, and what will go unsupplied without interference by
the state, I do not see how any use could be said to be per 8e
public, or how either a legislature or a court could form a judgment that would not be founded almost wholly upon theory and
conjecture. No one doubts that the building and maintaining of
our common highways is a public purpose. Why ? Certainly for
no other reason than that they furnish facilities for travel, the
transmission of intelligence and the transportation of goods. But
why should the state take this matter under its fostering care,
imposing upon the people a very great yearly burden in the
shape of taxes for their support, any more than many others that
might be mentioned of equal and perhaps greater importance to its
citizens ?
Is it of greater concern to the citizen that he should have a
road to travel on when he desires to visit his neighbor in the next
town, or transport the products of his farm or his factory to market
and bring back the commodities for which they may be exchanged,
than that he should have a-mill to grind his corn, a tanner, a shoemaker and a tailor to manufacture his raw material into clothing
wherewith his body may be covered.? Doubtless highways are of
great public benefit, without them I suppose the whole state would
soon return to its primal condition of a howling wilderness, fit
only for the habitation of wild beasts and savages. How would it
be if there were no mills for the manufacture of lumber, no joiners
or masons to build houses, no manufacturers of cloth, no merchants
or tradesmen to assist in the exchange of commodities ?
These suppositions may appear somewhat fanciful, but they illustrate the inquiry, Why is the building of roads to be regarded as a
public service, while many other things, equally necessary for the
upholding of life, the security of property, the preservation of
learning, morality and religion, are by common consent regarded
as private, and so left to the private enterprize of the citizen ?
The answer to this question surely is not found in any abstract
principle of law. It is essentially a conclusion of fact and public
policy, the result of an inquiry into the individual necessities of
VOL. XXIV.-51
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every member of the community, which in the aggregate show the
character and urgency of the public need, and the likelihood tht
those necessities will be supplied without interference from the
state. Obviously it bears a far closer resemblance to the deduction of a politician than the application of a legal principle by a
judge. Should it be found by experience that no person in the
state would, voluntarily and unaided, establish and carry on any
given trade or calling, universally admitted to be necessary for the
upholding of life, the preservation of health, the maintenance of
decency, order and civilization among the people, would not the
carrying on of such necessary trade or calling thereupon become a
public purpose, for which the legislatute might lawfully impose a
tax? Experience shows that highways would not be built, or, if
built, would not be located in the right places with reference to
convenient transit between distant points, nor kept in suitable
repair, but for the control assumed over the whole matter by the
state; and so the state interferes and establishes a system, and
imposes an enormous burden upon the people, in the shape of
taxes, compelling them to supply themselves with what they certainly need, but need no more than they need shoes or bread, and
nobody ever complained that the interference was unauthorized or
the purpose other than a public one.
Enough has been said to show the delicate nature of the task
imposed upon the court, when they are called upon to revise the
judgment of the legislature in a matter of this description. It is
especially delicate for two reasons; first, because the discretion of
the legislature with respect to the whole subject of levying taxes
is so very large, and their power so exclusive that it is not always
easy to say when the limits of that discretion and power have been
passed; and second, because the rule to be applied, is furnished,
not so much by the law as by those general considerations of public
policy and political economy, to which allusion has been made.
I do not deny the power and duty of the court, when private
rights of property are in question, to settle those rights according
to a just interpretation of the constitution ; and the discharge of
that duty may involve a revision of the judgment of the legislature
upon a question which, like this, partakes more or less of a political
character.
But before the court can reverse the judgment of the legislature
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and the executive, and declare a statute levying or authorizing a
tax to be inoperative and void, a very clear case must be shown.
After the legislature and the executive have both decided that
the purpose for which a tax is laid, is public, nothing short of a
moral certainty that a mistake has been made can, in my judgment, warrant the court in overruling that decision, especially
when nothing better can be" set up in its place than the naked
opinion of the court as to the character of the use proposed.
Certainly it is not for the court to shrink from the discharge
of a constitutional duty ; but at the same time it is not for this
branch, of the government to set an example of encroachment upon
the province of others. It is only the enunciation of a rule, that
is now elementary in the American stAtes, to say that, before we
can declare this law unconstitutional we must be fully satisfied,
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that the purpose for which the
tax is authorized is private and not public.
I have spoken incidentally of our common bighways, and it has
been said that their purpose is to furnish to the public facilities for
travel, for the transmission of intelligence and the carrying of
goods." No one will contend that to build and maintain them
is not a public purpose. Indeed the public nature of this use is
so very obvious that it has been classed among those said to be

public per se (Whiting v. Sheboygan Railway Co., supra), standing in need of no credentials from the court to entite it to legislative recognition. Wherein does the use of a railroad differ? What
public benefit can be mentioned that comes from the building of a
common road, which does not come, in kind, if not in degree, from
the building of a railroad ? It is not necessary to enlarge upon
the benefits of either; they are doubtless numerous and varied, so
numerous indeed, so interwoven with everything that distinguishes
an intelligent, virtuous, rich, well organized and well governed
state, from a tribe of primitive barbarians, that an attempt to trace
them all would be little less than an attempt to search out the
sources of our civilization. The point is they are alike in kind,
and when it is admit.ted that the construction of one class of roads,
is clearly, beyond all possibility of doubt, a public purpose, I cannot conceive upon what ground it is to be said, that the construction of the other class, is beyond all reasonable doubt a private
purpose.
It is said that railroad corporations are private ; that the roads
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are built and run for private gain; that the public can only enjoy
the benefits offered by them, upon payment of a toll, and therefore
the purpose is private. The short and conclusive answer to all
this, in my mind, is that the character of the agency employed,
does not and cannot determine the nature of the end to be secured.
To say of a railroad corporation, that it is a private corporation,
and therefore the construction of a railroad is a private purpose,
sbems to me, in truth, no more logical, if less absurd, than to say
of any officer or agent of the state, he is an individual with all the
private interests and private associations of other citizens, therefore the purpose of his office, and of all his official acts, is private..
The argument that because a toll is granted, therefore the purpose
must be private, carried to its logical results, would certainly declare the purpose of a very large number of public offices in the
state to be private ; among them the secretary of state, justices
of the peace and of police courts, registers of probate, registers of
deeds, sheriffs, clerks of the courts, town clerks, &c., &c. If the
purpose is public, it makes no difference that the agent by whose
hand it is to be attained is private, nor, if the purpose were private,
would it make any difference that a public agent was employed.
The question, therefore, whether a railroad corporation is to be
regarded as public or private, or both, that is, public in one aspect
and private in another, seems to me quite immaterial, and that
the decision of that question one way or the other does not advance
the inquiry we have in hand.
It has been admitted by some, who have maintained with singular
ability and zeal the position of the plaintiffs in this case, that the
state might legally take into its own hands, the whole matter of
railroads within its limits-might build, equip, operate and control
them, making use of no intermediate agents in the business; because in that case, the people would remain owners of the property
into which their money has been converted. With great deference,
it seems to me, this is a concession of the very point in dispute.
The form of the argument seems to be this: the state cannot
levy a tax for a private purpose (so much all admit); the building
of a railroad is a private purpose; but the state may nevertheless
levy a tax to build a railroad, provided, the tax be large enough
to carry through the whole enterprise without calling in the aid
of any other agency.
Or to draw from the same premises, the conclusion sought to be
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established here; the state cannot levy a tax for a private purpose;
the state may levy a tax to wholly build, equip and run a railroad;
therefore, the building of a railroad is a private purpose. This
does not bear examination.
Another argument may be noticed here. It has been said by
courts whose decisions we are accustomed to regard with great
respect, that, admitting the power of the legislature to authorize
towns and cities to subscribe for stock in railroad corporations and
issue bonds or levy taxes in payment thereof, it does not follow
that they can lawfully authorize the direct appropriation of the
public funds to aid in the construction of a railroad where no stock
is taken; because in that event, no interest or ownership results
to the town in the property of the corporation, and no voice in
the control or management of its affairs is secured. I do not
understand how this can be said by a court of law. Upon what
ground can the legislature authorize the raising of a tax to
pay for stock in a corporation of any sort, unless the purchase
of such stock will be a devotion of the public funds to a public
service? It is a matter of common knowledge that the original
stock in railroad corporations often becomes worthless or nearly
so; but whether such a result is to be apprehended or not
makes no difference, as far as I can see, with the argument. If
the end in view is private and not public, the legislature might as
well authorize a town to enter into copartnership with any private
person in the prosecution of any private enterprize or business,
and furnish its stipulated proportion of the capital to be invested
by levying a tax, as to authorize it to purchase such stock, even
were it likely to advance in value on their hands, and the people
thus be gainers by the operation. Deny that the end is public,
and at the same time admit that a tax may be levied for the purchase of the stock, and the inevitable conclusion appears to be,
that towns may be authorized to engage in the private and perilous
business of dealing in stocks, and so apply the public funds to a
purpose as remote as any that can well be conceived from that
permitted by the constitution, to say nothing of the fact that such
investment must be made with a reasonable assurance that the
money will be lost. Clearly, one or the other of these propositions
must be changed; either we must admit that the end in view is
public, or deny the power to purchase stocks when the end in view
is merely a private one.*
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It is said that the power to tax involves the power to destroy;
and that this is true is well shown by the recent example of the state
banks, whose existence was terminated by a tax of ten per cent.,
imposed by Congress on their circulation.
But how does this
strengthen the position of the plaintiffs? They say that if the
legislature have the constitutional right and power to authorize a
tax of three per cent. to aid this railroad, they have the constitutional right and power to levy a tax upon all the property in the
city of Keene equal to the full value of such property, and give
that to the same road. Suppose this be granted, what does it
prove as to the object for which the tax is laid ? Is it not equally.
true that they might authorize a tax equal to the full value of all
the property in the city for the support of the public schools, the
public highways, or any other object of a confessedly public nature ?
The suggestion is plainly of no force in an inquiry as to the nature
of the purpose for which a tax has been authorized or levied, for
the reason that the supposed power of destruction is a necessary
incident of the taxing power, and follows it, whatever be the object
for which it is put forth, whether public and legal, or private and
illegal. It amounts to little more, in the present ease, than the
truism that any governmental power may be abused by the agent
in whose hands it is reposed.
But, if the question on which this case must turn has been
rightly apprehended, I think it was decided more than thirty years
ago in the case of The Concord Railroadv. Greeley, 17 N. H. 47,
where it was held that a railroad is in general such a public use as
aflords just ground for the taking of private property, and appropriating it to that use. A glance at the yearly legislation in this
state with reference to the taking of land for railroads against the
owner's consent is sufficient, without looking elsewhere, to show
that for several yrars before the case of Concord Railroad v.
Greelely arose, much doubt was felt by the legislature and the
people at large, as to the existence of such a right ; and a strong
disposition is manifest to deny its exercise. The first charters to
railroad corporations, granted the right to lay out their road, and
necessarily to take land for that purpose. See Private Acts of
1835, pp. 201,212, 223, 264; Private Acts of June session 1836,
p. 341 ; Private Acts of 1837, p. 336; Private Acts of 1839. pp.
456, 470. At the June session of 1836, a general law was passed,
entitled, an act to provide a more cheap and expeditious mode
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of assessing damages for land or materials taken by railroad corporations, which unequivocally recognises the existence and validity
of the right thus conferred by the charters: Public Acts, June
session 1836, p. 299. This act was repealed at the November
session of the same year, and an act substituted in place of it
covering the same general ground, but more comprehensive and
specific in its details, pioviding for an assessment of damages by
jury in case the parties were not content with the award of the
committee, &c. " Public Laws, November session 1836, p. 248.
Approved January 13th 1837. It is noticeable also that at the
November session 1836, an act was passed (approved January
14th 183T), authorizing the town of Concord to purchase and hold
stock in the Concord Railroad corporation to an amount not exceeding $30,000: Public Acts, November session 1836, p. 316.
But before 1840, for reasons that are well known, but need not
be stated here, the public mind became somewhat agitated upon
th general subject of the legal relations borne by railroad corporations to the people and government of the state, and the rights
and duties of such corporations, and the power of the legislature
to appropriate private property to their use, without the owner's
consent. We accordingly find that at the June session of that year,
an act of a somewhat sweeping character was passed, whereby the
Acts of June 1836 and January 1837, in reference to the assessment of damages, and the act authorizing Concord to purchase
and hold stock in the Concord Railroad, were all expressly repealed,
and it was further enacted, "that from and after the passage of
this act, it shall not be lawful for any corporation to take, use or
occupy any lands, without the consent of the owner thereof, unless
the construction of the work contemplated in the act of incorporation shall have been commenced prior to the passsage of this act :"
Laws bf June session 1840, ch. 498, p. 438. At the Novem-ber
session of the same year, another act was passed which, whether
called forth by actual grievances or not, shows in a striking light
the state of public sentiment and the temper of the legislature.
It was enacted "that from and after the 15th day of March A. D.
1841, it shall be lawful for the owner or owners of any land taken
by any railroad corporation, in. the construction of their railroad,
when such landowner shall not have been fully compensated for
the same on or before the 15th day of March 1841, to remove the
rails from said railroad, fence up the land, and take and retain
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possession of the same until entire satisfaction is made to the owner
or owners of the land thus taken:" Laws of November session
1840, p. 504. This latter act was repealed by the Revised Statutes which went into effect March 1st 1848,' but the provision of
the former, that no railroad corporation shall tiake any land for
the use of said corporation without the co'nsent of the owner thereof,
was retained and appears as sect. 1 of ch. 142, R. S. Things
remaincd in'this position until 1844, when an act was passed, entitled "An Act to render railroad corporations public in certain
cases, and constituting a board of railroad commissioners :" Laws
of November session 1844, ch. 128. Section 8th of this act contains an elaborate provision for a lease under the seal of the state,
signed by the governor and certified by the secretary of state,
whereby the right to construct a railroad over the route proposed
should be granted and guaranteed to the corporation for a term
not less than one hundred, nor more than two hundred years, for
the public use and benefit, with the right of user in the same, to
pass and repass with their locomotives, cars and vehicles of transportation thereon, &c.-a device for finding the way out of a
dilemma, which would not do discredit to the ingenious inventors

of many of the legal fictions with which the common law still
abounds.
The next year (1845) came the case of Concord Railroad v.
Greeley,, where the constitutional power of the legislature to authorize the taking of private property for such a use was strenuously denied. It is obvious, even without going outside the statute
just referred to for evidence, that this was a question which had
seriously engaged the public mind, and one upon which opinions
greatly differed. Under these circumstances it was natural that
the case should receive a careful examination by the court; and I
think it may justly be said that the opinion by Mr. Justice GILCHRIST is among the most valuable to be found upon the general
subject of which it treats. le says: "The constitution of this
state is not so much a constitution delegating power, as a constitution regulating and restraining power. All power in the largc.t
terms applicable to such a subject, is conferred by the people,
through the constitution, upon the general court, subject to the condition in its exercise, that it shall pass no laws repugnant to the
limitations and restrictions in the constitution." He considers the
objection that the power of eminent domain cannot be exercised
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except through the medium of a public corporation, and says the
question involved is not what is a public, and what is a private
corporation, but whether this corporation be one that may hold the
land of an individual for the public use.
In considering the great question in the case, namely, whether
the proposed use was public, he says: "It is sufficient for this
occasion to say, that the use of a thing may be considered public,
so far as to justify the exertion of the legislative prerogative in
question, if it be devoted to the object of satisfying a reasonable
pervading public demand, for the facilities for travel, for transmission of intelligence and of commodities, not extraordinary as
compared with those enjoyed by communities of like pursuits.
Such objects rank themselves in fact among the first duties of a
government from the moment that it has secured itself against
foreign aggression and established tranquillity within its own borders. Without these the citizen pines in seclusion.. The bounties
of nature and the fruits of his labor which commerce would transmute into wealth are wasted, and he provides himself with difficulty, if at all, with those things which embellish home and render
its appropriate enjoyments possible." I am not aware that the
soundness of this opinion has been questioned; certainly it has
been acquiesced in and acted upon by the legislature and the
people, as the undoubted law of the state ever since it was rendered.
The legislature has again and again, in a variety of forms, directly
and indirectly, declared the use to be public, and has jealously
guarded against the possibility of an inference that the yight thus
to ta e land, could be derived from any other source than the
supreme law-making power of the state.
Railroads are declared to be designed for the public accommodation, like other highways, and therefore to be public; and it is
said that being public highways, they can be laid out, built, maintained and put in operation only by virtue of grants of the legislature or of authority derived from them. They are required, in
times of war, insurrection or invasion, to transport soldiers, munitions of war and other property of the state, as well as soldiers,
munitions of war and other property of the United States, and the
mails of the United States, at such rates as the governor and
council shall impose, if the parties do not agree. They are forbidden to discontinue their roads and required to keep them in
good repair, and discharge their duties in carrying phssengers and
VCL. XXIV.-52

410

PERRY

ET A.L. v.

CITY OF KEENE.

freight agreeably to their proper object and purpose: Gen. Stats.,
chs. 145, 146. Besides, their charters are always carefully guarded
to prevent an inference that they are not the creatures of the state,
charged v%11public functions and subject to legislative control.
Undoubtedly a legislative declaration that a given use is publio
cannot be regarded as conclusive to all intents without denying the
power of the court to interpret the constitution ; nevertheless, it is
true'that the creator of a thing may generally impose upon the
work of his own hands such qualities and characteristics as he
chooses, and when we see that the legislature, in establishing railroad corporations, has always been so careful, not only to bestow
upon them attributes and powers consistent with no other idea
than that their purpose is public, but to lay upon them also obligations and duties which would be clearly unjust and arbitrary in
any other view ; and when, in addition to this, we find the statutes
full of declarations that the use is a public use, it would seem that
-nothing which falls much short of absolute demonstration would
warrant the court in holding that the use is after all private.
Thus far, indeed, the cases all agree. It is nowhere contended
and is not contended by the plaintiffs that a railroad is not a public
use in such sense that land, the private property of individuals,
inay be taken for its construction. But a strenuous effort has been
nade to distinguish between the nature of a public use that warrants the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and that which
warrants the exercise of the taxing power in its behalf. Of course
the use which warrants the taking of land for a road-bed must be
public, otherwise every charter granting that right and every
general law recognising its existence and regulating the mode of
its exercise has been nothing less than an arbitrary and despotic
interference by the legislature with private rights of property in
flagrant violation of art. 12 of the Bill of Rights, as well as the
other provisions of the constitution, whereby those rights are
secured.
The argument, then, admits that the use is public, but holds
that it is not sufficiently public, or is not public in the particular
way to bring it within the category of objects for which taxes may
be imposed; either in degree or kind the public quality which it
confessedly possesses falls short of that required by the constitution to justify an exercise of the taxing power. It is incumbent
on those who undertake to maintain this distinction to point out
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clearly the differences on which it rests. An assertion that it does
exist is not enough, nor is the argument advanced by a repetition
of such assertion, even though made in confident and emphatic
terms. What is the rule wherewith we are to determine when a
given public use is of a character to warrant the exercise of one
power and not the other ? What ii the principle to be applied ?
No one will contend thaf the power of eminent domain, and the
taxing power, though similar, are in all respects identical, but all
agree that neither can be exercised except for a public end.
Which is the higher power, or, in other words, which requires the
greater public exigency to call it forth? What is the nature of
those objects which lie on one side of the line, and-what of those
upon the other side? Where is the line to be drawn and what are
the reasons that determine. its location ? These are some of the
questions not to be evaded, or met with much speech and ingenious
ratiocination, but to be answered fairly and clearly, before a court
can say that the legislature have beyond all reasonable doubt transcended their constitutional powers in declaring that a use which
is of such character, that is, public in such sense that private property may be taken and appropriated in its behalf, is also a public
use in such sense that taxes may be levied in its behalf.
In those cases to which we have been referred by plaintiffs' counsel, where an'attempt to do this is made, it does appear to me the
failure has been rendered only more conspicuous by the eminent
ability of those who have undertaken the task; and after a most
careful examination of those cases, if we were to hold that a railroad, being a public use for which the land of individuals may be
taken against the owner's consent, is not a public purpose for which
taxes may be imposed, I should be utterly at loss what sound
reason to give for the distinction, or in what terms to frame a rule
to govern the future action of the legislature in cases of a like
description.
Unless the court are to stand between the people and their
representatives, and declare when the latter have misjudged in
their deliberations, and set up limits to the legislative powers of
the general court not found in the organic law of the state, it is
clear to my mind that this law cannot be annulled by a judicial
sentence or decree.
SlIITn and RAND, JJ., delivered opinions in concurrence.
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MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. HATTIE B. TISDALE.
In a suit by an executor or administrator, tle letters testamentary are admissible
in evidence and are conclusive of his right to sue.
But in an action between strangers, such letters are not admissible as evidence
of tile death of the decedent.
In an action by a wire upon a policy of insurance on the husband's life in her
favor; letters of administration to her upon his estate are not evidence of tie husband's death.
I

error to the Circuit Court of the United States fbr the District of Iowa.
This action was brought upon a policy of insurance, issued to
IN

Mrs. Tisdale upon the life of her husband. Evidence was given
tending to show the death of Mr. Tisdale on the 24th of September
1866. This evidence consisted chiefly in'the sudden and mysterious disappearance of Mr. Tisdale, under circumstances making
probable his death by violence. Evidence was given by the defendant tending to show that he had been seen alive some months
after the date of his supposed death.
To sustain her case the plaintiff offered in evidence letters of
administration upon the estate of her husband, issued to her by
the county court of Dubuque county, Iowa. The defendant objected to the admission of this evidence. The objection was overruled and the letters were read in evidence, to which the defendant
excepted.
In the charge of the judge, he said: "The real question is
vhether Edgar Tisdale was dead at the time of issuing the letters
of administration. It is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that
fact. She has shown as evidence of that fact letters of administration issued to her as administratrix by the probate judge. It is
the duty of the court to instruct you that this makes a pridfacie
case for the plaintiff, and changes the burden of proof from the
plaintiff to the defendant. * * * Without contradictory evidence,
these (the letters of administration) give the plaintiff the right to
recover."
To the charge in this respect the defendant excepted.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
IUNT, J.-In
an action brought, not as administrator, but in
an individual character, to recover an individual debt, where the
right of action depends upon the death of a third party, to wit, an
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insurance upon his life, do letters of administration upon the estate
of such person, issued by the proper probate court, afford legal
evidence of his death ? This is the question we are called upon
to decide. It is presented sharply, and is the only question in
the case.
The authority in favor of the admission of the letters as evidence
of the death of the party, in a suit between strangers, is a general
statement to that effect in 1 Greenl. Evid., § 550. The cases cited
by the writer in support of the proposition are Tompson v. Donaldson, 8 Esp. 64; _French v. French, Dickens 268; .Hanblin's
Case, 3 Rob. La. Rep. 130; Jeffers v. 1?adcliff,10 N. H. 245. In
the case first cited the authority does not support Mr. Greenleaf's
statement. It was held that the letters did not afford sufficient
proof of death, and, no further evidence being given, the verdict
was against the claimant. In French v. French the court held in
terms against the theory that the letters were evidence of death,
"but under all the circumstances admitted the probate as evidence
of death." This case was that of a bill filed by an heir against
one in possession of the estate, and in that case Mr. Greenleaf
hardly contends that the letters are evidence of death. In Tisdale
v. Con. Life Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 177, and in the same case in 28
Iowa 12, cited by the defendant in error, the law was held as
claimed by her. The other cases cited by the defendant in error,
including Hamblin's Cae, are those where the administrator or
executor was a party to the suit in his representative capacity, in
relation to which a different rule prevails.
In the New Hampshire case above cited there was evidence to
sustain the ruling independently of the letters, and the case concedes that the law is otherwise in England, and bases itself upon
the peculiar organization of the courts of that state.
On the other hand, the text-writers-Phillips on Evidence, vol. 2,
p. 98, m, ed; 1868; Tamlyn, 48 Law Library 154, referring to
foons v. Des Barnalles; Ilubback on Succession, 51 Law Library
162-concur against the rule laid down by Mr. Greenleaf.
In Aoons v. Des Barnalles, I Russell 307, it was held that letters of administration were not primdfacie evidence of death, and.
the defect was supplied by other evidence. Lord ELDON says, in
Clayton v. Graham, 10 Yes. 288, that it is the constant practice
to require proof of death, and that probate is not sufficient. In
Leach v. Leach, 8 Jur. 211, Sir KNIGHT BRUcE refused to order
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the payment of money upon letters alone, but required other evidence. In Blacklham's 0ase, 1 Salk. 290, it was held that the
sentence of the spiritual court in granting letters is not evidence
upon any collateral matter which would have prevented the issuing
of the letters.
In speaking of judgments in rem, and where the judgment may
be evidence against one not a party or privy to it, Mr. Starkie
says: "This class comprehends cases relating to marriage and
bastardy where the Ordinary has certified sentences relating to
marriage and testamentary matters in the spiritual court :" 1
Starkie on Evid. 872, m. What is meant by this is explained at
a subsequent place, where he says : "The grant of a probate in
the spiritual court is conclusive evidence against all as to the title
to personalty, and to all rights incident to the character of an
executor or administrator :" p. 374, m. He cites in support of
this statement the case of Allen v. Dundas, 3 Term Rep. 125, that
payment of money to an executor who has obtained probate of a
forged will is a discharge to the debtor. The grant is conclusive
in all business transacted as executor, and concerning the duties
of the executor, that it was properly made.
This accords with the principle hereafter laid down.
The chief- ground of argument to admit letters testamentary as
evidence of the death of the party, is that the order of the probate
court issuing them, is an order or judgment in rem. But a judgment in ren is not primd facie evidence; it is conclusive of the
point adjudicated unless impeached for fraud: 1 Starkie on Evid.
372, m; Freeman, infra. If admissible on this principle, the letters were conclusive evidence of the death of Tisdale. But this
is not claimed by any argument.
Again, the probate court has never adjudicated that Tisdale was
dead. Death was not the res presented to it. Shall Mrs. Tisdale
receive letters testamentary ? was the res, and upon that only has
there been an adjudication: Hubback, supra, 162, m.
The letters testamentary issued to an administrator by a probate
court, as a general rule, are evidence only of their own existence.
They prove, that is to say, that the authority incident to that
office or duty has been devolved upon the person therein named;
that le has been appointed, and that he is executor or administrator
of the party therein assumed to have departed this life. Different
states have different provisions as to who may be executor or ad-
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ministrator, excluding some persons and preferring others, in the
order and manner in their statutes specified. Thus, persons convicted of infamous crime are excluded from this office, and persons
of notoriously evil lives may be passed by, in the discretion of the
probate court. Sons or daughters or widows are entitled to take
in preference to others ; unmarried women are entitled in preference to married women.. Certain notices may be, and usually are,
required to be given of the proceedings to obtain letters testamentary. - On all this class of subjects the letters are the evidence
that the proceedings have been regularly taken, and that the person
or persons therein named are those by law entitled to the office.
Upon these points the court has adjudicated. No proof to the
contrary can be'admitted in an action brought by the executor as
such. Parties wishing to contest that point, must do it before the
probate court, at the time application is made for issuance of the
letters, or upon subsequent application, as the case may require. ,
In an action brought by such executor or administrator touching
the collection and settlement of the estate of the deceased, they are
conclusive evidence of his right to sue for and receive whatever was
due to the deceased. The letters are conclusive evidence of the
probate of the will. It cannot be avoided collaterally by showing
that it is a forgery or that there is a. subsetuent will. The determination of the probate court is upon these precise points and is
conclusive: 2 Smith's Lead. Cas., 6th Am. ed., 669; Vanderpool
v. Van Valkenberg, 6 N. Y. 190; (!ollin8 v. Ross, 2 Paig3 396;
Freeman on Judgments 507, citing numerous cases.
If the present suit were brought by the plaintiff as executor or
administrator to collect a debt due to her deceased husband or to
establish a. claim arising under a will, of which probate had been
made by her, she would have been within these rules. The letters
testamentary would not only have been competent evidence, but
they would have been conclusive of her right to maintain the action;
and unimpeachable except for fraud.
Such, however, is not. the case before us. The suit is by the
plaintiff as an individual, to recover a debt alleged to be due to her
as an individual. It is a distinct and separate proceeding, in
vhich the question of the deathof the husband comes up collaterally.
The books abound in cases which show that a judgment upon
the .precise point in controversy cannot be given in evidence in
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another suit, against one not a party or privy to the record. This
rule is appliud not only to civil cases, but to criminal cases and to
public judicial proceedings, which are of the nature of judgments
inrem.
If an indictment for an assault and battery by A. upon B. is
prosecuted to a conviction, the judgment for some purposes is conclusive evidence. Thus, upon a subsequent indictment for the
same offence, it would be conclusive in favor of A. that he bad
been once tried for the same offence and convicted, and that he
could not again be put in jeopardy therefor. But if A. sues B.
for the same assault and battery, it cannot be doubted that it would
be incompetent to introduce the record in the criminal case as evidence of the offence. For this purpose it is "inter alios acta."
B. was no party to that proceeding. In theory of law he was not
responsible for it or capable of being benefited by it: 1 Starkie
on Evid. 317, m.
So, if B. should afterwards be indicted for an assault upon A.,
arising out of the same transaction, the record would not be competent evidence to show that A., and not B., was in fact the
offending party.
In some states provision is made for the admeasurement and
setting apart of dower to the widow of a deceased person. Officers
are appointed for this purpose, who make their certificate awarding
particular property to her use, and file their report in the proper
office. Although this certificate is judicial in its character and
assumes that the deceased had title to the property described, and
the certificate is valueless except upon that supposition, it has still
been held that it is no evidence of title, and that the title must be
proved as in other cases: Jackson v. Bandall, 5 Oowan 168; Same
v. Ily, 6 Id. 816.
It has been held that a comptroller's deed for the non-payment
of a tax due the state is not even primd facie evidence of the facts
giving him the right to sell, such as the assessment and non-payment of the tax, although they are recited in the deed and this
deed is in compliance with the statute. These facts must have
existed to give a right to sell, but they are not established by the
deed. They must be made out by independent p-.oof: Tallman v.
Wite, 2 N. Y. 66; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77 ; Beckman
v. Bigham, 5 N. Y. 366.
A certificate of naturalization issues from a court of record when
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therehas been the proper proof made of a residence of five yearq,
and that the applicant is of the age of twenty-one years and is of
good moral character. This certificate is, against all the world, a
judgment of citizenship, from which may follow the right to vote
and hold property. It is conclusive as such, but it cannot, in a
distinct proceeding, be introduced as evidence of the residence or
age at any particular time 6r place, or of the good character of the
applicant: Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch 176; Stark v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 7 Id. 420.

The certificate of steamboat inspectors, under the Act of Congress of 1852, is evidence that the vessel was inspected by the proper officer, but it is held that it is not evidence of the facts therein
recited, when drawn in question by a stranger, although the officer
was required by law to make a return of such facts: Erickson v.
Smith, 2 Abb. Ct. of App. N. Y. 64; 38 How. Practice 454.
So it has been held that where a sheriff sells real estate, giving
to the purchaser a certificate thereof. Although there can lawfully
be no sale unless there be a previous judgment, and although the
sale is based upon and assumes such judgment, and although the
law requires the sheriff to give such certificate, the recital by the
sheriff of such judgment furnishes no evidence thereof. It must be
proved independently of the certificate: Anderson v. James;4 Rob.
Sup. Ct. 35.

-

So, on an application by a wife for alimony, pending a divorce
suit prosecuted against her, the fact that her husband has recovered
a verdict against a third person for criminal connection with her,
has been held not to be even presumptive evidence of her guilt:
filliams v. Williams, 3 Barb. Ch. 628.
Authorities of this nature might be greatly extended. Enough
has been said to demonstrate that neither upon principle nor authority was it proper, in the individual suit of Mrs. Tisdale against
a stranger, to admit letters of administration upon the estate of her
husband as evidenco of his death.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial had.
On the general subject of the conclusiveness of the judgment of a probate court
and -its effect on third parties, see Roderigasv. East River &vings Inst. and not,
ante, p. 205.-En.
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United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Illinois.
ESSEX COUNTY NATIONAL BANK v. BANK OF MONTREAL.
It is the duty of a bank to whom a check is sent for collection to present it and
demand payment within the time prescribed by law, and if not paid notify the
proper parties of its dishonor.
A bank upon whom a check is drawn is liable, before acceptance, only to the
drawer; it cannot be made liable to the holder except by its own consent.
. If a bank to whom a check is sent for collection, instead of demanding immediate payment, accepts a certification of it, that will create such a new relation between the parties as to discharge the drawer, and will render the bank accepting
the certification in lieu of payment, liable for any loss arising to the holder from
the failure of the bank upon which the check was drawn.
The party to whom the check is endorsed for collection, is the proper plaintiff,
and an amendment, under the practice in Illinois, is allowable at the trial, substituting such party as plaintiff.

THIS was an action to recover from defendant the amount of a
check sent to it for collection. The facts sufficiently appear in the
opinion.
.Hitchcock & Dupee, for the plaintiff.
Dexter & Smith, for the defendant.
HoPKINs, J,-P. Becker & Co., of Chicago, on the 3d day of

August 1875, sent their check on the State Street-Savings Bank
to T. B. Peddie & Co., of New York, for $856.37. It was endorsed by the payees to the plaintiffs and by the plaintiffs was
endorsed to the German-American Bank, New York, for collection,
and by that bank in the usual course of business was endorsed to
the Bank of Montreal, of Chicago, the defendant, for collection.
It belonged to the plaintiff in this case, but the plaintiff having no
correspondent or agent in Chicago, it employed the GermanAmerican Bank to collect it, and that bank employed the defendant, according to usage among banks located at different points.
The Bank of Montreal received the check about 11 o'clock on the
morning of the 9th of August, and soon thereafter sent it by its
messenger to the State Street Savings Bank for payment. The
messenger presented it at the counter to the teller, who informed
him that the cashier was not then in, and that he could not pay it
in his absence. The messenger took the check away, and later in
the day called again with it and presented it to the same party
.again, and he made the same reply, that the cashier was out, and
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be could not pay it until he came in. The messenger then asked
the teller to certify it, which lie did in the usual mode of certifying checks by that institution, and thereupon the messenger took
the check away with him. The teller, when he certified the check,
charged the amount of it up to the drawer's account, which then
exceeded the amount of the check, and credited certificate account
with amount of the same. The defendant also sent the check for
payment on the next day at about 11 o'clock, and it was not paid
because the bank had not the funds to pay it. The bank kept its
doors open during all of the 10th of August, but bad not the funds
to pay the check, and failed to open after that day. The testimony
is not very clear as to whether the bank had currency enough o
the 9th to pay the check, if payment had been insisted upon, but
as this point is not material in the view I have taken of the law
of this case, I shall not stop to settle it; when it was presented
after certification it was not paid because the bank was insolvent.
The defendants had the check to collect. It was transmitted
to them for that purpose, and their duty as collecting agents was
to present and demand payment within the time prescribed by law,
and, if not paid, notify the proper parties of its dishonor. If that
had been done, the rights and remedies of all parties liable upon
it, when it came into their hands, would have remained intact. If
loss occurs by the acts or omissions of the party thus assuming the
duty of collection, it should fall upon the delinquent agent, not
upon the absent overseer.
The State Street Savings Bank was not liable to the holder of
the check without acceptance. It was liable before acceptance
only to the drawer: Chapman v. White, 6 N. Y. 412. It could
not be made liable to the holder of the check except by its own
consent. It had the funds of the drawers, and according to the
usual course of dealing with its customers, was under obligation to
pay on demand all checks drawn upon it by them, but a refusal to
do so would not give the holder of the check the right to sue the
hank. The drawer in such case would be liable, and he could
sue the bank immediately, without redeeming the check, and the
bank would be liable for damages for its refusal to perform its
undertaking with him as depositor: Alerchants' Bank v. State
.Bank, 10 Wall. 604, 605; Bank of Bepublic v. .lMillard,Id. 152.
This being the law, the duty of the defendant upon receipt of
the check for collection was plain. It was to present it for pay-
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ment, and only for payment. This it did at first, and if it had
stopped then there would have been no liability upon it. But
it did not; it went farther; it asked for and received the certification of the bank upon the check. By this act a new relation was
created between the parties. The amount the check called for was
withdrawn from the drawer's account and control, and thereafter
they had . right of action for it against the bank. The technical
operation of the transaction was a transfer to the holder of the
check of the drawer's funds and right of action against the bank.
It superseded the previous rights and obligations of the parties,
particularly of the drawers.
iBefore that, the drawers could have stopped payment
of the
check or withdrawn the funds by other checks. After the certification they had no control over the funds or action of the bank
in reference to it, nor any right to sue the bank for it. Nor did
the bank owe them any duty in relation to it. It no longer possessed the character of a check. If the drawers had taken it up
before its certification it would have been useless, but after that
they could only get the money by surrendering it. It resembles,
after certification, more the certificate of deposit than a check. Now,
what was the effect upon the legal rights and liability of the drawers?
Did it not discharge them from all further liability upon the check,
and if such should be found to be the consequence, does it not
follow that the defendants are liable to the owners for the amount ?
If they have by their acts released the responsible drawers whereby the instrument is made worthless, why shall they not make good
the loss ?
In Smith v. Mfillard, 48 N. Y. 176, it is said that presenting a
check for payment and accepting a certificate as good is equivalent
to payment: In Morse on Banking, p. 282, it is laid down that,
if the holder chooses to accept the bank's certification, no matter
to suit whose convenience, there can be but one result. The
promise of the bank on the drawer's account, accepted as satisfactory by the creditor, discharges the debtor, and by the same action
deprives him of all further concern in the premises. The bank
no longer owes him any duty which he can enforce, or for the
breach of which he can sue. If this is the result of the act of the
defendant in accepting the certification of the check, it would seem
too clear for discussion that the defendant had incurred a liability
to pay the amount of it to its principal. The drawers being re-
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leased by the certification, and the bank being unable to pay, it
follows irresistibly that the plaintiff is entitled to recover of the
party releasing the drawers, whereby the amount of the check is
lost to them.
It was claimed on the part of the defendant on the trial that the
plaintiff must show some damages by the act. If the act released
a responsible party that would be damage enough. But the law
presumes damages from the negligence or unauthorized act of a
collecting agent of commercial paper whereby any party to it is
released or not charged: Commercial Bank of Albany v. Hughes,
17 Wend. 94. And if this presumption is not conclusive, but
liable to be overthrown'by proof to the contrary, it is the duty of
the party at fault to show clearly that no damages -did result to the
holder of the paper from their negligence, which in this case the
defendant did not do. It did not clearly show that the check
would not have been paid on the 9th of August if payment had
been insisted upon. I think the only safe and maintainable doctrine in this case is that the defendant assumed the risk of payment by the bank when it accepted the certification, and if the
bank did not pay then they must. In laying down this rule I
assume that the certificate operated as a release or payment as
to the drawers, and that they were no longer liable upon the
paper. This release I regard as the pivotal point in this case, and
upon that point I am not forced to rely upon my own judgment.
I find the precise question has been decided by the Court of Appeals Qf New York in the case of Tlhe First National Bank o"
Jersey City v. Leach, 52 N. Y. 350. That was an action on a
check drawn by defendant on the 21st of November 1871, on the
Ocean National Bank, payable December 12th 1871. The bank,
the plaintiff in that case, discounted it for the payee, and ateleven
o'clock A. m., on the 12th day of December, they presented it to
the Ocean Bank, and got it certified as good. The drawer then
had an account there sufficient to pay it, which was on the certification charged up to him on the Ocean Bank books. Within an
hour after that the Ocean Bank suspended. The check was again
presented on that day for payment, and was duly protested for
non-payment. The bank then sued the drawer to recover the
amount of it. The court upon that state of facts held that the
plaintiff could not recover ; that the certification operated as a
payment as between the holder and drawer.
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In the opinion it is said that "the law will not permit a check,
when due, to be then presented and the money left with the bank
for the accommodation of the holder without discharging the
drawer." That if the holder chooses to have it certified instead
of paid, he will do so at the peril of discharging the drawer.
But they say that "this would not discharge the drawer of a
check who himself procureal it to be certified and then put it in
circulation; that the reason of the rule would not apply to him,"
and conclude the opinion by saying "that upon principle it must
be held that the bank holds the money after certification by request
of the holder, not at the risk of the' drawer, but of the holder of
the check."
This is the only direct authority I have found upon this question,
from which I judge that the practice of Iholders of checks getting
them certified is not very usual, for if it were, other cases would have
found their way into the books and come under judicial consideration.
The defendant on the trial cited Bickford v. First National Bank
of Chicago, 42 Ill. 23, and Bounds v. Smith et al., Id. 245. From
an examination of those cases, I do not 'see that they conflict with
the case of Bank v. Leach, 52 N. Y., eupra. In those cases the
checks were certified at the request of the drawer before delivery.
This expressly appears in the last case, and the judge in his opinion
in that says, "the case in all its important features is the same as
Bickford v. Bank," so that I must assuime that the checks in both
these cases were certified by request of the drawer, which presents
an entirely different question from this, and leaves the point involved
here unconsidered in those cases.
In Brown v. Lecker et al., 43 Ill. 497, cited by the defendant's
counsel, the check was also certified by the request of drawer before
it was passed by hin, so that the reasoning of the court in that
case was not predicated upon the same facts as appear here. But,
as I understand those cases, that court holds that a check operates
to transfer the amount named in it to the payee, and authorizes
him to sue for andreceive it from the bank. If such is the doctrine
of that court, I am not at liberty to follow it, for the Supreme
Court of the United States, in The Bank of the Republic v. Hillard,
10 Wallace 152, has decided differently. And as the question
involved isone relating to commercial securities, and belongs to
the domains of general jurisprudence, this court is nut bound by
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the decision of the state courts where the matters arise : Township
of JPine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wallace 666. But, waiving this
view and difference between the courts on this point, I do not
think that the decision of the learned court of Illinois above referred to, when carefully examined, will be found to touch the
point involved here. It was not before that court in either of those
cases, and although the general language used might seem to be in
conflict with the conclusions I have reached in this case, still when
read and considered as used in reference to the fact and question
before that court, no conflict or discrepancy of opinion will be
found to exist. Those cases are clearly distinguishable on the
facts from this ease, and are, therefore, not authority upon the
point involved here. I am therefore of the opinion that the
defendant is liable for the amount of the check, with interest from
the certification, as by its certification the drawer was discharged.
A question was suggestedl as to the right of this plaintiff to sue
the defendant, as it was not its agent, alluding to the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hoover,
Assignee, &c., v. Vise et al., vol. 8 Chicago Legal News, page 193,
but it was stated, and not disputed, that the plaintiff's attorneys
had authority to sue in the name of the German-American Bank,
as well as in the name of the present plaintiff, the real owner, and
it was claimed that an amendment under the laws of the state was
allowable, in the discretion of the court, by inserting the name
of the German-American Bank as plaintiff in lieu of the present
plaintiff. And as a decision making the change necessary has
been announced since the commencement of the suit, and as no injury can result, as it appears to the court, to the defendant thereby,
I direct and allow an amendment in that respect by striking out
of the process and pleadings the name of the present plaintiff and
inserting in lieu thereof the name of the German-American Bank,
and, as so amend d that judgment be entered for plaintiff and
against defendant for $882.76, the amoudit of the check and interest, with costs of this suit to be taxed.

McLEERY v. McLEERY.

Supreme Court of Maine.
ELLA E. MOcLEERY v. SALLY McLEERY.
A father died, leaving a widow. His homestead descended to his two sons. In
consideration of their having the use and income of the whole estate, the sons, in
writing, promised the widow an occupancy of a portion of the premises, and certain farm stock for her use, and a certain yearly payment. Afterwards, one son
conveyed to the other. The latter then conveyed the entire premises to his mother
by a warranty deed. Then he died, leaving a widow. In an action of dower by
the widow of the son, against the widow of the father, it was hdd1. That the agreement between the sons and the mother, did not operate either
as an assignment of dower to her or as a release of dower by her.
2. That the condition of the senior widow, as to her own dower, is the same,
essentially, as if it had been specially assigned to her.
3. That her right of dower was not extinguished by merger in the fee conveyed
to her by her son.
4. That she is not estopped by the covenants of warranty in such deed from
availing hersel of her right of dower in this action ; inasmuch as such right was
paramount to and independent of the title procured by the deed.
5. That there are two dowers in the estate ; the senior widow having one-third
of the whole, and the junior widow one-third of the remaining two-thirds, as
dower; and that the junior widow is not now, nor will she be at the death of the
senior widow, dowable in any greater proportion thereof.

AcTION of Dower. Referred to the full court on a case stated.
S. Belcher, for plaintiff.
.Philip . Stubb, for defendant.
PETERS, J.-William McLeery was seised of the messuage de-

scribed in the writ. At his death, the tenant, who is his widow,
became entitled to dower in: it. Subject to her right of dower, the
estate descended to his two sons. One of the sons, the husband
of the demandant, acquired his brother's interest in the estate,
thus owning the whole. At his death, his widow also became
entitled to dower. Both husbands are dead and their wives survive. Here, then, two widows are dowable in the same estate.
Their respective rights were as follows : The tenant (wife of the
father) having the older title in dower, would have for her dower
one-third of the whole. The demandant (wife of the son) being the
younger widow, would have one-third of the remaining two-thirds
of the estate. Thus, the tenant would have three-ninths, and the
demandant two-ninths thereof.

This result comes from the prin-

ciple established in the familiar maxim of ancient origin, that
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"dower ought not to be sought from dower." Nor will the junior
widow be dowable in the one-third that may be assigned to the
senior widow, upon the death of the latter; and for this reason.
In order to recover dower, she has to count upon her husband's
seisin. But .during his lifetime he had no seisin of the one-third,
vhich goes to his mother as dower. When his mother's dower is
assigned to her, she partakes seisin therein by relation from her
husband, continuing his seisin, and to that extent defeating the
seisin of the son, who in such one-third has only a reversion. Had
the son received the title of the estate from his father by deed,
and not by descent, the rule would be otherwise. In such case
the son would have had a seisin in his lifetime of the whole estate,
sufficient to give his wife dower in the two-thirds during his
mother's lifetime, and in the whole estate when the mother's title
to dower ceased: Geer v. Hfamblin, 1 Maine 54;. Brooks v. Everett, 13 Allen 457; 4 Kent's Com. 64. See also, under appropriate heads, Washburn's Real Estate and Scribner on Dower, for
a more particular elucidation of the principles stated.
But the question arises, whether the demandant maynot be
dowable in the whole estate, instead of two-thirds thereof, upon
the ground that the title of the elder widow to dower has been in
some way extinguished or lost. And this is claimed by the demandant to be the case from several causes.
First, she contends that the paper given by the sons to the
mother has that effect. And upon the other hand, the tenant
claims that her acceptance of the paper amounted to an assignment
of her dower. But our opinion is that the agreement had neither
the one effect nor the other. It neither assigned dower, nor extinguished it. It was nt'an extinguishment of dower, because
there is no release or conveyance under her hand or seal, nor does
she in any way design or attempt to surrender her right. Nor
would it operate as an assignment to her of her dower. A portion
of the consideration to her in the agreement consists of the executory promises of the sons, which may never be fulfilled. The
agreement (not signed by her) merely related to "the use and
income" of her dower by the sons until set out to her. It operated
only to suspend her claim for a time: Sargent v. Boberts, 34
Maine 135; Austin v. Austin, 56 Id. 74.
Then a question arises, whether the demandant may not have
dower in the whole estate until the dower of the tenant has actually
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been assigned to her. It is held by text-writers, and is so decided
generally, that the maxim dos de dote peti non debet does not apply
when there has not been an actual assignment to the first widow.
This is upon the principle that the husband of the second widow
may be considered as seised in his lifetime of the estate charged
with the right of dower of his mother, as against all others but her.
A stranger cannot avail himself of the contingency that the first
widow may never enforce her right. When she does enforce it,
then an assignment already made to the second widow becomes
wholly defeated or diminished thereby: Dunham v. Osborn, 1
Paige 684; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 5 Id. 161; Safford v. Safford,
7 Id. 259. To the same effect are the cases cited 8upra. See also
Young v. Tarbell, 37 Maine 509. But the answer to-this position
is, that the rule does not apply to this case. The tenant is not a
stranger. She is in possession, claiming her estate of dower. Her
condition is the same essentially as if a special assignment had been
made to her. There is no need of a separation of her estate in
dower, from her estate of inheritance, for any practical purposes.
She does elect to enforce her claim, by a resistance to the claim
of the second widow. If the demandant should recover according
to her claim, the tenant might perhaps have an action against her
to recover a part of it back again. We think the legal rights of
the parties can be as well settletl in the present action as in any
other way.
Then it may be argued that the tenant's right of dower has been
lost by consolidation with the fee conveyed to her by her son. In
L-eavitt v. Lumprey, 13 Pick. 382, it was decided that a second
widow was not entitled to dower in the whole of an estate against
the tenant to whom the senior widow had conveyed her right after
she had recovered judgment for dower therein, but before it was set
off to her. While in Atwood v. Atwood, 22 Pick. 283, it was
held that a prior right of dower which had been released to the
tenant before any suit to enforce the same, could not be set up to
diminish the claim of a second widow who claimed dower in the
whole estate. But we have already expressed the opinion that in
the case at bar the senior widow is in the same condition and bears
the same relation with all parties interested as she would if her
dower had in point of fact been set out to her. She is entitled to
a life-estate of one-third. She is in actual possession of it as well
as of the reversion, and she is defending her possessioh. In this
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state the doctrine of merger is not favored in law or equity. It is
clear enough that if this was a proceeding in equity a merger could
not be regarded as taking effect. It is manifestly for the interest
of the tenant to keep her two titles distinct, in order that the demandant may recover no greater amount of dower than she would
have been entitled to if they had continued to be held by different
persons. The tendency in the courts has been to admit the appli.cation of the same principle, in proceedings at law in cases where
the forms of the transfers are such that it can reasonably be
effectual. The tenant having all of the estate, including her right
of dower therein, may certainly be regarded as having her estate
of dower as effectually as if she had recovered judgment therefor.
She cannot sue herself to obtain it. She has it. Having the whole
estate, she has all the parts: Gampbell v. Inights, 24 Maine 332;
-Holdenv. Pike, Id. 427; Simonton v. Gray, 34 Id. 50; Strong
v. Converse, 7 Allen 557 ; Savage v. Hall, 12 Gray 365.
The point, however, upon which the demandant places the
greatest reliance and stress, is that the tenant is barred from her
claim of dower, upon the technical ground of estoppel. It is
contended that, by accepting from her son a deed of the premises
with the usual covenants of warranty, she admitted ihat he was
fully seised of all the premises as of fee, and the argument is that
she is now estopped to show the contrary. In support of this
view, Lewis v. .Illeserve, 61 Maine 374, is cited for authority.
The tenant admitting Lewis v. leserve to be correctly decided,
denies that it can apply to a case like the one at bar. We think
the distinction is well taken. That case was decided with exact
correctness, having reference to the actual question then before
the court for their determination. There it appeared that the
tenant who resisted the claim of dower, obtained all his title from
the husband of demandant, and there was no pretence that he had
any kind or claim of title from anybody else. He merely set up
that some one else might have a title paramount to his. But he
had no relation with it, if it was so. The court were clearly of
the opinion that he was estopped to deny the seisin of his own
grantor, -who was the husband of the demandant in that suit. All
the cases are in accord as far as that case goes. The point is there
briefly alluded to, the decision of it not being really necessary to
the result of the case. But the present case is a different one.
Here the tenant does claim a title of dower outside of and superior to
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the right and title of her grantor. She had no occasion to purchase
what already belonged to her, nor is it to be supposed that there
was any design by her to do so. Her grantor bad already acknowledged and submitted to her superior claim. The reasonable presumption is that she paid for the premises, deducting from the price
for the entire premises the value of what was already her own. It
would seem hard and inequitable that the mere form of the instrument of conveyance should have the effect to deprive her of a valuable interest and right which she already possessed. Such a result
was undoubtedly never dreamed of by the parties concerned when
the conveyance was made. Nor does the law require it to "be so. We
are aware that there have been contrary decisions upon the point presented. Nor is there a satisfactory consistency upon it in the decisions of our own state. But we regard the opinion in the leading
and important case of Fosterv. Dwinel, 49 Maine 44, as a settlement
of the question so far as the rifghts of this tenant are concerned.
That case has been much commended by several text-writers since
it was promulgated, and believing that the arguments and conclusions of the court therein are based upon sound logic and good
sense, we see no good reason why it should not be adhered to in a
state of faets like those presented in the present case : Bigelow on
Estoppel 71; 2 Scribner on Dower 227.
Judgment for demandant for her dower in two-thirds of the premises described in the writ.
APPLETON, C. J., WALTON, BARROWS, DANFORTH and VIRGIN,

JJ., concurred.

Circuit Court of the City of 1Richmond, Virginia.
W. B. DUNCAN

AND

P. C. CALHOUN, TRUSTEES, V. CHESAPEAKE &
OHIO RAILROAD CO. ET ALS.

Employees of a defaulting railroad company are not to be considered as creditors at large of the company in regard to their claims for wages in arrears at the
time of the appointment of a receiver for the company.
When mortgagees come into a court of equity seeking satisfaction of their claims
against a railroad company by suit for foreclosure, they should be required to satisiy all arrearages of pay due employees out of the trust property or its futuro

earnings.

THIS was a cause in equity, which came up on motion and was
heard at the February Term 1876 of the Circuit Court of the City
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of Richmond, on the report of thelHon. W. C. Wickham, receiver,
asking the instructions of the court as to the disposition of the
surplus earnings of the railroad, and requesting to be allowed to
discharge the arrears of pay due employees prior to his appointment as receiver.
IW. J. Robertson, H. T. Vickham and If. IT.. togeman, for receiver, in support of the motion.
Jaunes Lyons and J. A. Jones, contr'i.
Sdpman and Barlow, Larocque .f M aciarland,of New York,
for complainants, assented to the motion.
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.-Under orders heretofore entered in
this cause, the court, in the interest of the creditors, has assumed
control and administration through its receiver of all the franchises
and property of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company.
That company was successor to the Virginia Central Railroad Company, and in succeeding to all its franchises and rights of property,
assumed all of its outstanding obligations.
It is admitted that these franchises and property thus acquired
cuan onere, are abundantly safficient to satisfy the creditors of the
Virginia Central Railroad Company, and their claims are conceded
to be paramount to those of any claimants under obligations of the
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company.
There appears to be no doubt that their claims will be paid to
the full extent of principal and interest out of the property now
under the control of the court.
These creditors have patiently forborne to press their rights, and
being now entitled to payment of arrears of several instalments of
interest, and some of them to payment of principal, may properly
expect every reasonable consideration in the disbursement of any
funds subject to the order of the court, as far as may be practicable,
towards the satisfaction of their claims. But, unhappily for all
parties to this cause, the immediate satisfaction of the most meritorious claims is altogether impracticable. Mly province is simply
to determine how far it is practicable under the circumstances, and
so far, to order that it shall be made.
The creditors of the Virginia Central Railroad Company, as well
as all the creditors of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Coin-
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pany, %Yhoare practically interested just now in any orders of this
court, claim under obligations of those companies secured by several
deeds of trust executed by the respective companies, conveying in
very comprehensive terms all corporate franchises and rights of property. These deeds were frequently in common parlance and are
sometimes in these proceedings styled mortgages, and I shall accept
the phraseology, notwithstanding its inaccuIracy.
It was a substantial part of all these mortgages that the custody,
control and administration of the trust property should be left undisturbed in the hands of the railroad company, not merely until
default in the terms of their covenants, but thereafter, until, in the
intelligent discretion of the trustees, or upon the command of a
large fractional representation of the bondholders, or in the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, such custody should be
changed.
The character of the security offered for the investments asked
by the corporation in placing its bonds upon the market, made this
provision of the mortgages a most essential element of the contract.
Each mortgage contemplated an indefinite number of cestuii que
trust, varying in amount of interest and subject as to persons and
amount to all the fluctuations of the money market. The security
tendered was not to be measured in its value by the probable result
of any every-day sale under the hammer of the auctioneer. The
great value of the security consisted in the importance of the franchise and the providence with which the money contributed for its
development should be appropriated to the construction of a great
inter-state highway, the accumulation of all necessary material for
transportation of persons and property, and an economical and
energetic prosecution of the work. The corporation was engaged
in a great experiment, and upon the success of that experiment
necessarily depended, to a great extent, the value of all its obligations. But it was a corporation based upon solid and substantial
investments, to which millions of money had been contributed by
the Commonwealth and several of the counties of Virginia and
many individual citizens of Virginia and her sister states.
The value of all this investment of capital was at stake, and
made subordinate by the mortgages to the value of the bonds. The
guarantee of the intelligent and watchful self-interest of the stockholders, to ensure the success of the experiment, was therefore no
inconsiderable element in the security of the bondholder.
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It was not unreasonable to suppose that they would see to it that
the administration of the road would be confided to officers of intelligence, capacity and providence, and that those officers, selected
by the stockholders to protect their interests, would be not unsafe
protectors of the paramount interest of the bondholders. The laws
of the Commonwealth required the periodical selection of these
officers, gave to every stockholder a voice in such selection, and
measured the value of his voice in proportion to the value of his
interest by a prescribed rule. But after their election, during
their continuance in office in the interest of the great mass of the
stockholders, the law protected them in the intelligent discharge
of their responsible trusts from the interference of any inconsiderable fraction of the individual stockholders. It was in like manner,
in all these mortgages, deemed necessary, in the interest of the
great mass of the bondholders, to protect these officers against unnecessary and improvident interruption by a few impatient or capricious bondholders. For the protection of the bondholders, gentlemen of intelligence, position and character were designated in
each mortgage as trustees, and large powers, to be exercised in
their discretion for the benefit of the cestuis que trust, were con.
ferred upon them. But that discretion was not left unlimited.
Equally in the interest of the company as in that of the mass of
the beneficiaries, the power to require the trustees, after default
of the company, to enforce the trust, was studiously withheld from
any single beneficiary or any inconsiderable number of the benefi.
ciaries. Power was conferred upon the trustees in some of the
deeds to act after default according to their own discretion to the
extent of selling the trust property; but no such sale could be
made without advertisement for such length of time in advance as
would give full opportunity to any and all parties in interest to
invoke the interference of a court of equity, and enforce the execution of the trust in subordination to its decrees.
In none of the deeds, however, was power given to the trustees,
in advance of sale, to divest the control of the officers of the company at their own independent election. Such power was given in
several of the deeds, certainly in that under which the complainants
claim, but only in the contingency that the trustees should be so
required by a prescribed number in interest of the beneficiaries.
Until the administration of the trust property was assumed by
this court through its receiver, none of the trustees, in the exercise
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of their discretion or in obedience to the command of the requisite
number of cestuis que trust, ever suggested, in the discharge of
their trust, the propriety of dispossessing the constituted officers
of the company. The receiver of this court, under the orders of
this court, acquired pos.Ression of the trust property only from those
constituted officers.
All of these martgages, it will be observed, invited the investment of capital upon faith in the security of an uncompleted railroad, and every purchase of a bond involved upon the part of the
purchaser a like confidence, to a certain extent, with that which
the state in conferring the franchise, and the stockholder in investing his money, reposed in the executive officers of the company for
the faithful and energetic discharge of the duties assigned to them
by the fundamental law of the corporation. That duty involved
the prosecution to a successful completion of the projected railroad,
and as rapidly as it could be completed even partially, the administration and conduct of any completed parts as common carriers
of persons and property, under all the obligations as such to the
state and the public. In consideration of their paramount interest,
the bondholders were invited to confide, and by their acceptance
did confide, to the stockholders the selection of these officers, until,
after default of the company, they might elect to enforce the trusts
of the deeds.
In the meantime these officers, in the common interest of' stockholder and bondholder, were charged with their grave responsibilities. To meet them, the subscriptions of stock having been
exhausted, they could have in contemplation of all parties no possible means except the earnings of the road and the credit of the
company, so far as it might with recorded notice of the liens of the
bondholders be at all available.
Prior to any default of the campany in the payment of interest
upon the bonds, it was not unreasonable to suppose that the credit
of the company might be available with its officers for this purpose. But immediately upon default, publicity of the embarrassment of its finances was unavoidable, and after that default had
continued a few months the company became simply a tenant at
the will of the bondholders of all its corporate franchises and property. Thereafter the credit of the company could certainly not
have been contemplated as adequate to the necessities of the officers
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in charge in maintaining and preserving the value of the trust
property.
What, then, had they to rely upon ? Under the letter of the
contract, upon nothing but the earnings of the road so long as it
might be permitted to remain in their hands. But it certainly
ought to have been contemplated, in making the contract, that this
might prove to be an insufficient reliance. The earnings of the
road were necessarily subject to the vicissitudes of trade and travel,
and dependent upon the continued preservation, in despite of all
accidents, of the continuity of its road and the regularity of its
trains, and upon the confidence of the public in the providence and
-watchfulness of the officers charged with the control and management of the road in insuring all necessary and available safeguards
against accident to life, limb or property.
That providence and watchfulness necessarily required the continual outlay of large sums of money in daily expenditures for
purchase of material of every description and provision for anticipated emergencies all along its four hundred and twenty miles of
track. It imposed the necessity of the employment of a small
army of subordinates all along its roadway and in control of every
moving train, to be controlled and directed by skilled and intelligent overseers. The laws of humanity, the police laws of two
states, overriding all questions of pecuniary interest in stockholders
or bondholders, forbade the relaxation of that providence and vigilance, whatever it might cost, for one instant of time.
These necessary supplies could not be purchased by the pound
or the piecemeal from day to day. This army of employees could
not be paid all along the roadway with the setting of every sun.
Those who furnished the one were compelled to await the ordinary,
routine of auditing and settling the account, incident to every business of magnitude, and the employees had to await the arrival of
some periodic pay-day. If the officers in charge of this road were
under obligation to announce, upon offering to make every purchase
and in engaging the services of every such necessary subordinate.
that pay for such purchase or labor was to be forfeited at any
moment when the bondholders might elect to arrest their administration of the road, it would have been manifestly impracticable to
continue the operations of the road with any safety to the public
for one single day after the right of the bondholders to take possession of the road had been consummate.
VOL. XXIV.-55
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Were they under any such obligation?

The contract did not

command them to surrender possession to the trustees until required.
They had no right of their own election, without the orders of the
stockholders who had placed them in charge, to do so. Their duty
under the law to the stockholders, and their duty under the contract to the bondholders, required them to retain possession. But
if they were under any such obligation, it necessarily involved the
impossibility of their continuing to conduct the road, and the unavoidable and immediate suspension of all trade and travel along its
track. To say nothing here of the breach of faith to the Common'vealth which conferred the franchise, and the great inconvenience
to the public in whose interest the franchise was granted, such a
suspension would have necessarily impaired immensely the value
of the security of all the bondholders.
It appears from the record of this case that the officers of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company were placed in this dilemma.
There is certainly nothing now before me which requires any censure of their conduct under these embarrassing circumstances. I
have only occasion to consider that matter, however, so far it may
affect the rights of those who dealt with them under these circumstances as the representatives of all parties interested in the franchises and property.
There can be no difficulty in rejecting any claim upon the funds
under control of the court, preferred by any parties who can 'properly be regarded as creditors at large of the Chesapeake and Ohio
Railroad Company, however meritorious the consideration upon
which their claims against the said company may be based. Even
if there be material furnished by any such creditors now in the
daily use of the receiver, if such material were furnished on the
credit of the company, any claim on account thereof must, in the
absence of any lien retained by the special contract or reserved by
the law, be subordinate to the recorded lien of the mortgages.
But can the claims of the employees of the company for arrearages of pay, or the comparatively small class of claimants referred
to in the third clause of the receiver's report,' be properly regarded
2 The following is the part of the report referred to :;I III. There is a class of claims which it is proper that I should bring to the
notice of your honor, arising from the purchase of material for the use of the road
in the month of September 1875, and the first eight days of October. Much of
this material was on hand, at the time that the road was taken out of the hands
of the company on the 9th of October, by the order of the Circuit Court of the
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in this suit as claims of creditors at large of the Chesapeake and
Ohio Railroad Company?
I am not required to consider how these claims should be regarded if this were an application by the claimants to arrest the action
of the trustees, or any of them, under the powers granted by their
several deeds. This matter presents itself as incidental in the
enforcement by a court of equity of the equitable rights of the
bondholders under one of the deeds. So far as they are concerned,
they have voluntarily subjected themselves to the enforcement of
all equitable principles in the administration of the property under
control of the court. The beneficiaries 'under the second mortgage
of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company being subordinate
in interest to them, must, I take it, necessarily bear the ill consequences, if any, of the fundamental rule of this court, invoked by
the complainants, that he who asks equity must do equity.
I incline to the opinion that the beneficiaries under all the Virginia Central Railroad mortgages, though superior in dignity to
those represented by the complainants, are in this suit amenable to
the same rule. But it is unnecessary to consider that question.
It is conceded on all hands that the claims of these creditors are
paramount, and that payment in full of principal and interest will
be made to them; and as the allowance of the claims under consideration-confessedly of a high equitable character-can only
postpone the realization of their full rights, they must, under
familiar principles governing all proceedings of courts of equity,
submit to the delay.
I am of opinion that these unpaid employees and other claimants
referred to cannot be regarded as creditors at large of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company. If it can be said that they
United States for the Eastern District of Virginia; part of it is still on hand
amongst the stores of the company; a part of it has been worked up in the repair
of engines which are still undergoing repairs, and is not yet in use.
"The purchase of the articles, the subject of these claims, was regarded by
those who sold them, and by the officers of the company who bought them, as a
cash one, and payment was only delayed by the custom that prevails in mercantile
transactions of a like character, of rendering monthly bills for the current month's
supplies, and having them paid about the first of each month, instead of demanding cash for each article as it is furnished. These claims would, had not the United States Court taken the road out of the company's hands, all have been paid in
the months of October and November, in the regular course of the company's

business.
claims."

They amount to about $17,000.

I ask for authority to pay these
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extended credit at all, it was credit not to the Chesapeake and Ohio
Railroad Company, but to the officers then in charge of its franchises, rights of property, &c. The Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad
Company had been then so long in default that the right of the
bondholders to claim possession was fully consummate, and this was
a matter of common notoriety. It could not be expected that the
employees all along the tradk of this road should pause amidst
their unceasing round of daily duty to inquire whether the bondholders had or had not asserted their rights and assumed control.
It was enough for them to know that the service they were rendering
was such service' as any proprietor would necessarily require, and
they had a right to believe that the officers left in notorious occupancy of the property, and charged before the public with the
responsibility of its care and custody, were abundantly authorized
to act for all whom it might concern in contracting for their
services.
The same principle will run through all the gradations of employment in this great corporation. These employees of every
grade and dignity had every right to believe, that so long as the
bondholders stood aloof without asserting their rights to possession,
they were willing to accept and regard pro tanto as their agents
for the preservation and protection of the property, the officers who,
placed in charge thereof by their defaulting creditor, could not in.
good faith to the creditor or the debtor abandon their posts, or be
derelict while they held them, to the trusts which they imposed.
These bondholders are now in a court of equity seeking satisfaction of their claims against the railroad company. They have
a right to be satisfied to the extent of an entire forfeiture of all the
proprietary rights of the company; but to concede to them, in
enforcing such forfeiture, a right to repudiate all responsibility to
satisfy these highly meritorious claims of employees, &c., out of
the property or its future earnings, would be grossly inconsistent
with plain equity. In this forum they must be held to be estopped
from denying the authority of the officers of the company under
the circumstances, as agents for themselves as well as other parties
in interest, to have incurred such liability.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in a
somewhat similar case, of Douglas, &c., v. Oline, &C., of which I
have been furnished by counsel with a newspaper report, fully
sustains these views.

